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M.: States--Constitutional Debt Limitation--Issuance of Revenue Bonds
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

dead until the presumption arises under the policy. Is there any
conceivable reason for requiring the beneficiary to consider him
as dead before that time? In the absence of proof of death, the
beneficiary should be at liberty to believe that the insured lives until
the presumption of his death arises. When the beneficiary becomes
convinced of his death and gives notice to the insurer, it should
not be said that such notice was not given as soon as was reasonably
possible.
Whether notice of the loss was given as soon as was reasonably
possible was a question of fact to be determined by the jury. Glens
Falls Indemnity Co. v. Harris,supra; Yanago v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
164 Va. 258, 178 S.E. 904 (1935). No jury having been demanded by
the parties, the court made the necessary findings of fact. The
court of appeals cannot reverse findings of fact of the district court
unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Ladd, 193 F.2d
929 (4th Cir. 1952); Rodgers v. United States Lines, 189 F.2d 226
(4th Cir. 1951). Under the circumstances it cannot be said that
the finding of the district court that notice was given as soon as
was reasonably possible was erroneous. It follows that the decision
of the court of appeals was correct.
L. L. P.
STATEs-CoNsTrnrUONAL DEBT LnvnrATIoN-IssuANcE OF REVENUE BoNDs SEcumm BY PiEmGE or Urcrvmsrry TurrIoN FEs.-Re-

lator, under authority of W. Va. Acts 1956, c. 7, adopted a resolution
authorizing the issuance of revenue bonds of the State to finance
construction of agricultural and engineering buildings at West
Virgiia University. The bonds were to be secured by a pledge of
a new special fund to be composed of University tuition fees, which
were formerly paid into the State treasury as general revenue. The
State constitution provides: "No debt shall be contracted by the
State, except to meet casual deficits in the revenue, to redeem a
previous liability of the State, to suppress insurrection, repel invasion
or defend the State in time of war... ." W. VA. CONST. art. X, §4.
D, Secretary of State, refused to attest or place the Great Seal of

the State upon one of the bonds, contending that the bond issue
would create a debt against the State, in violation of the State
constitution. Relator sought a writ of mandamus to compel D to
do the necessity acts to complete the execution of the bond. Held,
that the legislation would not create a debt against the State within
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the meaning of the constitutional debt limitation, and therefore,
that the legislation did not violate the constitutional provision. Writ
awarded. State ex rel. Board of Governors of West Virginia University v. O'Brien, 94 S.E.2d 446 (W. VA. 1956).
In 1933, the State Board of Control, which was then the governing body of West Virginia University, was authorized to issue
revenue bonds of the State to finance construction of dormitories,
and to provide for payment of the bonds from the income of the
dormitories. W. VA. CODE c. 25, art. 1, §§ 24-84 (Michie 1955).
The constitutionality of this legislation was never questioned. However, in Bates v. State Bridge Comm'n, 109 W. Va. 186, 153 S.E.
305 (1930), it was held that the issuance of bridge revenue bonds
to finance bridge construction, payable solely from the bridge tolls,
would not create a debt against the State within the meaning of
the constitutional provision. It seems clear, then, that when the
bonds are paid by the income of the facility for which the bonds
are issued, no debt against the state is created within the meaning
of W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
In 1953, legislation was enacted authorizing the Board of Governors of West Virginia University to pledge revenue from existing
dormitory facilities to secure payment of revenue bonds issued to finance construction of new dormitories at West Virginia University.
W. VA. CODE C. 18, art. 11, § lb (Michie 1955). The State Board of
Education was given like authority to finance dormitory construction
at the state colleges. W. VA. CODE c. 18, art. 2, § 18b (Michie 1955):
It is important to note that the income of the dormitories was not
a part of the general revenue of the State, but went into a separate
fund. W.' VA. CODE c. 12, art. 2, § 2e (Michie 1955). There have
been no West Virginia cases deciding whether a debt is created
against the State by a pledge of revenues from an existing facility
to secure payment of bonds issued to finance a new facility of the
same kind at the same institution. The authorities are in conflict
on this problem. See, e.g., Barbour v. State Board of Education,
92 Mont. 321, 18 P.2d 225 (1932), which holds that in a similar
situation no debt would be created against the state; and Wilder
v. Murphy, 56 N.D. 486, 218 N.W. 156 (1928), which holds that
a debt would be created against the state.
The procedure in the principal case goes even further than
those heretofore discussed, for here, the funds pledged were formerly in the State treasury as general revenue and were available
for general state purposes. - It would seem then, that the decision in
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the principal case, upholding a pledge of funds formerly a part of
the general revenue, would eleminate any doubt as to the constitutionality of the procedure authorized by W. VA. CODE C. 18, art.
11, § lb (Michie 1955), supra, and W. VA. CODE C. 18, art. 2,
§ 13b (Michie 1955), supra.
A 1942 constitutional amendment established the State Road
Fund, composed of all revenues from gasoline, motor fuel, and motor
vehicles, including taxation revenue; and it provided that these funds
would be used solely for construction, reconstruction, and improvement of public highways, and for the payment of bonds issued for
such purposes. W. VA. CONSr. art. VI, § 52. In State ex rel. State
Road Comm'n v. O'Brien, 82 S.E.2d 903 (W. Va. 1954), it was held
that a pledge of such funds as additional security for payment of
bridge revenue bonds would not create a debt against the State
within the meaning of the constitutional debt limitation. There, the
legislature had no control over the appropriation of the funds which
were pledged, as the constitutional amendment had specified the
purposes for which the funds would be used. The court said,
"Neither the general revenues, nor any other revenues of this State
are committed to the payment of such principal and interest, and
therefore, the bonds are not, and can not be, a general obligation
of this State. It follows, therefore, that no debt is created ..

. ."

Id.

at 909. (Emphasis supplied). In Warden v. Grafton, 115 W. Va.
438, 176 S.E. 706 (1934), the issue was whether a pledge of the
city's general revenues, other than property taxes, to secure payment
of revenue bonds issued to finance construction of a city hospital,
would occasion a debt against the city within the meaning of W.
VA. CoNsT. art. X, §8, which limits municipal indebtedness.
In
holding that it would, the court said, "Tledging of the general revenues of the city or any part thereof on the city's promise to pay
clearly constitutes a debt." Id. at 441.
The court in the principal case, in permitting a pledge of funds
formerly in the general revenue, did not extend the Warden case,
nor did it extend the implication in the State Road Commission case
that a pledge of general revenues of the State would violate the constitutional debt limitation. It said that the constitutional provision
"was intended to prohibit the creation of debts, by the State, required
to be re-paid by a public tax." Id. at 451. (Emphasis supplied.) As
a practical matter the funds diverted from the general revenue will
probably have to be replenished by an exaction of taxes, if the
State is to maintain its present'operations and services. If this is
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so, it would seem that it should make no difference whether the
tax is to be levied directly or indirectly.
The rule in West Virginia now seems to be that no debt is
created against the State within the meaning of the constitutional
debt limitation, unless the State obligates itself to levy taxes to
meet the obligation; with the exception that a fund established by
a constitutional amendment may be pledged for the purposes specified therein, regardless of whether the fund is made up of taxes.
The constitutional debt limitation is thus greatly narrowed from its
probable original intention. The West Virginia interpretation may
perhaps be regarded as a realistic interpretation of an unrealistic
constitutional provision. However, another method of handling the
debt limitation problems is suggested in Boe v. Foss, 77 N.W.2d 1,
7 (S.D. 1956): "If as some sincerely believe these organic debt
limitations are unrealistic and are hampering progress, the appeal
must be to the sovereign people. To amend the constitution is not
a function of the courts."
R.M.
ThusTs-LEsE oF TRusT PpoPERTY BEYOND TEBIu

APP.RovED.-

Petition by P, as trustee under the will of decedent and as guardian
of the estate for an incompetent who held an interest in the particular property involved, to extend the lease on the premises for a
term of fifty years beyond its expiration date. The existing ninetynine year lease under the trust was given for an annual cash rental
of $8,000 net with no provision for the readjustment of the rental
figure. Upon the death of the two beneficiaries of the trust, now
aged 69 and 64, respectively, the corpus and all accumulated and
unexpended income will be distributed to specified remaindermen.
The rental under the new ninety-nine year lease would immediately
be increased to $16,000 per year, subject to adjustment in accordance
with the fluctuations in the Wholesale Price Index. A lease for a
shorter term would not bring a satisfactory rental income. A guardian ad litem, appointed to represent minor contingent remaindermen, objected to the proposed lease, emphasizing that the trust
would terminate upon the death of two persons who had life expectancies of less than fifteen years. The district court authorized
the extended lease agreement, and an appeal was taken by the
guardian ad litem. Held, that the extension of the lease beyond the
period of the trust is justified where because of changed conditions
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